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Abstract
In this paper we consider innite horizon risk-sensitive control of Markov
processes with discrete time and denumerable state space. This problem
is solved proving, under suitable conditions, that there exists a bounded
solution to the dynamic programming equation. The dynamic programming
equation is transformed into an Isaacs equation for a stochastic game; and
the vanishin discount method is used to study its solution. In addtion, we
prove that the existence conditions are as well necessary.
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1 Introduction
Recently considerable attention has been given to the study of risk-sensitive
stochasic control problems [3] [11] [16] [17] [19]. This type of problem was
formulated rst in [15], and in the operations research literature in [14]. One
of the key results that has been explored in this study is the relationship
between risk-sensitive stochastic control problems and game theory [2] [6]
[10] [12] [18].
In this paper we are concerned with innite horizon risk sensitive stochas-
tic control problems with denumerable state space, discrete time parameter,
and bounded cost function. The solution of this problem is based on the
existence of a bounded solution to the corresponding dynamic programming
equation, which turns out to be a nonlinear eigenvalue problem. In [12] a
similar problem is studied for continuous variable systems modelled by dier-
ential equations. However, the approach we follow is technically dierent. For
nite state space this problem was solved in [10] using the Perron-Frobenious
Theorem and the policy iteration algorithm. Risk sensitive control problems
on a nite horizon for hidden Markov models were treated in [9].
In this paper we determine sucient conditions for the existence of a
solution to the dynamic programming equation. Our results are based on
the observation that the dynamic programming equation can be seen as the
Isaacs equation of an ergodic cost stochastic dynamic game (see [1, 12]).
Furthermore, we prove that these sucient conditions are also necessary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce the risk sensitive control problem and a verication theorem is
presented. Section 3 discusses sucient conditions for the existence of a
bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation. Finally, in Section
4 we prove that some of the sucient conditions introduced in Section 3 are
also necessary.
2 Preliminaries
The model. The discrete-time Markov control model we will be dealing
with is the following (see e.g. [1] [13]). Let (S;A; P; c) be a Markov control
model where the state space S is a (nonempty) denumerable set endowed
with the discrete topology, and A is a Borel space, called the action or control
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space. For every x 2 S, A(x) represents the set of admissible actions when
the system is in state x. The set of admissible pairs is dened by K =
f(x; a) : a 2 A(x); x 2 Sg, and is considered as a topological subspace of
SA. The transition law P is a stochastic kernel on S given K, and nally,
c : K ! IR is the (measurable) one-stage cost function.
Consider the history spaces Ho = S, and Ht := K Ht 1 if t = 1; 2; : : :.
An element ht of Ht is a vector of the form ht = (xo; ao; : : : ; xt 1; xt), where
(xn; an) 2 K for n = 0; : : : ; t  1, and xt 2 S. An admissible control policy,
or strategy, is a sequence  = ftg of stochastic kernels t on A given Ht,
satisfying the constraint t(A(xt)jht) = 1, for all ht 2 Ht; t  0. The set of
policies is denoted by P. Now, let F be the set of functions f : S ! A, such
that f(x) 2 A(x) for all x 2 S. A policy  2 P is stationary if there exist
f 2 F such that t(f(xt)jht) = 1 for all ht 2 Ht; t  0.
Let (
;F) be the measurable space that consists of the sample space

 := (SA)1 and the corresponding product -algebra F . Then, given any




stochastic process f(xt; at); t = 0; 1 : : :g are dened on (
;F) in a canonical
way, where xt and at denote the state and action at time t, respectively.
When po is the Dirac measure concentrated at x 2 S, we write P

x instead of
P po, and the corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E

x .
Throughout we assume the following, even when we do not mention it
explicitly.
Assumption A.1.
(i) For each x 2 S;A(x) is a compact subset of A.
(ii) The cost function c is nonnegative, continuous and bounded.
(iii) For all x; y 2 S, the function a 7! P (yjx; a) is continuous on A(x).
Risk sensitive control problem. For x 2 S;  2 P, the cost functional
(to be minimized) is the innite horizon exponential growth criterion










where  > 0 is the risk factor. Then the risk sensitive optimal control problem
is to nd a policy  2 P that minimizes J(x; ). The corresponding value





The main problem we are concerned with is to nd sucient conditions to
ensure the existence of an optimal stationary policy.
Verication theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that there exist a number  and a bounded function
W : S ! IR such that







eW (y)P (dyjx; a)g for all x 2 S: (2.1)
Then, for each x 2 S,
  J(x; ) for all  2 P:
Further, if f  is a stationary policy, with f (x) achieving the minimum on
































P (eW )(xt; at)
#
; (2.2)
where P (eW )(x; a) :=
R
eW (y)P (dyjx; a). Using standard properties of condi-





P (eW )(xt; at)
 P (eW )(xT 1; aT 1)
#
= eW (x): (2.3)
Then, since we are assuming that W is bounded, (2.3) implies the existence

















P (eW )(x; a)
M2: (2.4)
Therefore, from (2.2) and (2.4) we get
  J(x;):
The rest of the proof follows immediately replacing the inequality sign in
(2.2) by equality, and repeating the above arguments.
3 Dynamic programming equation
In this section we turn to the question of existence of a solution to the
dynamic programming equation (2.1).
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 3.1. For each e 2 S and f 2 F dene
e := min ft > 0 : xt = eg: (3.1)
If there exists e 2 S and C > 0 such that
Efx(e) < C (3.2)
for all f 2 F and x 2 S, then there exists a solution (;W ) to the dynamic
programming equation (2.1), with W bounded.
Remark 3.2. We anticipate that Theorem 3.1 can be generalized to weaker
conditions as in [1, p. 302], and active research in this direction is presently
in progress. Many sucient conditions for (3.2) are well known; see [1] and
references therein.
Before we give the proof of Theorem 3.1 we will introduce some prelimi-
nary results. Let P (S) be the set of probability vectors on S, i.e.
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Let us x  2 P (S). We dene the relative entropy function I(jj) : P (S)!













if (x) 6= 0
1 otherwise.
The next lemma establishes, using a Legendre-type transformation, the
duality relationship between the relative entropy function and the logarithmic
moment generating function. For its proof we refer to [7, Proposition II.4.2].














(x); x 2 S:
Therefore, using Lemma 3.3, we rewrite equation (2.1) as









c(x; a)  I(jjP (jx; a))g: (3.3)
This equation corresponds to the Isaacs equation associated with a stochastic
dynamic game with average cost per unit time criterion (see [10]).
6
The technique we will follow to prove Theorem 3.1 is the standard van-
ishing discount approach (see, e.g. [1] and the references therein). We con-
sider the corresponding innite horizon discounted cost stochastic dynamic
game. Let W be the upper value function of this game. Then, once we
nd a uniform bound for a \dierential" discounted value function, i.e.
h(x) := W(x)  W(e), with e as in (3.2), the theorem follows by letting
 ! 1.
First we introduce the innite horizon discounted cost dynamic game.
Stochastic dynamic game. Let S be the state space, A be the control
set for Player 1 (minimizer), and P (S) be the control set for Player 2 (max-
imizer). The reward function is (x; a; ) 7! 1

c(x; a)   I(jjP (jx; a)), with
(x; a; ) 2 K  P (S).
The evolution of the system is as follows (c.f. [10] [12]). At each time
t 2 f0; 1; : : :g the state of the system is observed, say xt = x 2 S. Then, a
control at 2 A(x) is chosen for Player 1, and t 2 P (S) is chosen for Player
2. Then, a reward 1

c(xt; at)   I(tjjP (jxt; at)) is earned, and the state of
the system moves to the state xt+1 according to the probability distribution
t.
Strategies. For each t  0, let Nt and Kt be the set of feasible histories
up to time t for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. That is, N0 = S and
Nt = (S  P (S))
t  S, while K0 = K and Kt = K
t K. Generic elements
of Nt and Kt are vectors of the form nt = (x0; 0; : : : ; xt 1; t 1; xt) and
Kt = (x0; a0; : : : ; xt 1; at 1; xt; at), respectively. A non-randomized strategy
for Player 1 is a sequence ~f = fftg of functions ft from Nt to A, such that
ft(nt) 2 A(xt) for all nt 2 Nt. We say that ~f is stationary if, for all t  0; ft
depends only on the current state xt, and ft = f 2 F is independent of t. A
non-randomized strategy for Player 2 is a sequence ~ = ftg of functions t
from Kt to P (S). Analogously, ~ is stationary if, for all t  0; t =  : K 7!
P (S).
Given the initial state x 2 S, and the strategies ~f; ~ being used, the
corresponding state process, xt, is a stochastic process dened on the canon-
ical probability space (S1;G; P
~f;~
x ), where P
~f;~
x is uniquely determined. We
denote by E
~f;~
x the corresponding expectation operator.
Equation (3.3) corresponds to the dynamic progamming (Isaacs) equation
of the stochastic dynamic game described above with average cost optimality
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criterion, dened for each x 2 S; ~f; ~ as











Then, in order to prove Theorem 3.1, we will study a sequence of correspond-
ing discounted games. Thus, given x 2 S; ~f; ~, dene the cost functional









c(xt; at)  I(tjjP (jxt; at))
#
; (3.4)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.
Denition 3.4. When there exist a pair of strategies (~f ; ~) such that
J(x; ~f
; ~)  J(x; ~f
; ~)  J(x; ~f; ~
)
for all ~f; ~, the value W(x) = J(x; ~f
; ~) is called the value of the game,
and (~f ; ~) are referred to as optimal strategies.










c(x; a)  I(jjP (jx; a))g; (3.5)
and it is the value function of the discounted cost stochastic dynamic game.
Moreover, the stationary strategies f  and , with















Proof. Let B(S) be the vector space of real-valued bounded functions de-
ned on S endowed with the supremum norm, i.e. for  2 B(S); jj jj =
supx2S j (x)j. Now, dene the operator L : B(S)! B(S) by
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c(x; a)  I(j   P ((x; a))g:
Then, the rst part of the lemma follows noting that L is a contraction opera-
tor and the Fixed Point Theorem. The rest of the proof is a straight-forward
application of standard dynamic programming arguments and Lemma 3.3.








eW(y)P (dyjx; a)g: (3.7)
This optimality equation has been studied by Chung and Sobel [5] (see also
the references therein), in the context of risk-sensitive discounted Markov
decision processes.
Now, following a standard approach, we dene h(x) :=W(x) W(e),
with e as in (3.2), and write (3.7) as







eh(y)P (dyjx; a)g: (3.8)
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We will prove rst that (1  )W(e) and h are
uniformly bounded. Note that from (3.3) and the denition of W we have
0  (1  )W(x) 
1

jjcjj for all x 2 S; (3.9)
where jjcjj stands for the supremum norm of c. We next consider h. Let
 2 (0; 1), and let f ;  be the optimal stationary policies for Player 1 and
Player 2 dened in Lemma 3.5. Then, using the fact that the stochastic
kernel of the Markov process xt, say P




00)P (x00jx; f (x))R
eW(y)P (dyjx; f (x))
;











































tr(x0; a0; : : : ; xt; at; xt+1); (3.10)
with P (eW)(x; a) :=
R
eW(y)P (dyjx; a), and r is dened implicitly.





















Also, from (3.7) and Jensen's inequality, and using the fact that c is nonneg-




Actually, we can prove, using the same arguments, by induction that for
















where the last inequality is due to Jensen's inequality and (3.2).
Therefore,
W(e) W(x)  (1  
C)W(e)









Thus, from (3.11)-(3.12) we get
jh(x)j  C 
1

jjcjj for all x 2 S (3.13)
Let n " 1 be given. Then, (3.9) and (3.13) imply that, by a suitable diagno-
lization, we may pick a subsequence fng (denoting it again by fng) along
which hn(x); x 2 S, and (1  )W(e) converge to some limits W (x) and ,
respectively. Thus, the theorem follows from (3.8) and an application of the
Dominated Convergence Theorem.
4 Necessary conditions
In the previous section we proved that sucient conditions to ensure the
existence of a bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation (2.1)
are the following.
(C1) Suppose that the unique bounded solution W of the equation (3.5)
satises:
( i) x 7! (1  )W(x) is uniformly bounded.
(ii) h(x) := W(x)  W(e) is uniformly bounded, with e 2 S being arbi-
trary, but xed.
The purpose of this section is to prove that (C1) is actually a necessary
condition for the existence of a bounded solution to the equation (2.1). See
[4], [8], where necessary conditions for the existence of a bounded solution
of the risk-neutral average cost optimality equation are given. Notice rst
that, if (;W ) is a solution of (2.1), then, for any constant k; (;W + k) also
satises (2.1).
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Theorem 4.1. Assume that there exist a number  and a bounded function




 W2(x) for al x 2 S; (4.1)
where W1 and W2 are solutions of (2.1) such that supx2SW1(x) = infx2S =
Wx(x) = 0. In particular,
lim
!1






Proof. Given a bounded function  : S ! IR, we dene the operator







 (y)P (dyjx; a)g:
Then, we can rewrite equations (2.1) and (3.7) as
e+W (x) = TeW (x)
eW(x) = TeW(x): (4.2)
Let W (x) = W(x) 

1 
. Then, from (4.2)
T (e



































 . Let  > 0 and x0 2 S such that




   > 0: (4.4)































which is a contradiction. Then, the left hand side of (4.1) holds. The proof
of the r.h.s. follows in a similar way and we omit it. Employing (4.1) yields
the rest of the theorem.
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